What is the future of Russia?

What are the possible scenarios for Russia’s future? We’ll look at a recent article discussing this question and rundown some of the news coming out this week. Finally, we’ll recap the results of the EU elections and the political fallout. 

In the most recent issue of the journal Foreign Affairs, Stephen Kotkin has an article about five potential futures of Russia after Putin. Kotkin is an historian of Russia, particularly the 20^th century, but is extremely knowledgeable and is an insightful thinker about Russian current events. What Russia will look like after the war in Ukraine and after Putin is an important question. The article stood out to me because I tend to be a bit too optimistic/hopeful and most of his futures are not very encouraging. I do not intend to summarize the entire article, but it is worth a read if you are interested in this type of thing. I want to briefly introduce the five futures and discuss the one or two I think are the most plausible in greater detail.  

Very briefly, here are the five futures Kotkin envisions. 1-Russia as France: this is the best case, where Russia keeps a strong Presidential system and a strong state but lightens up on the oppression and country invasion. 2-Russia Retrenched: this is (possibly) the worst case, where the nationalists who think Putin is not nationalist enough take over but are more isolationist. 3-Russia as Vassal: the idea here is that Russia is so weakened it becomes dependent on China. 4-Russia as North Korea: Russia becomes isolated, dependent on China, but China still would not have complete control over Russia’s behavior (as in the vassal future). 5-Russia in Chaos: this is sort of Russia in the early 1990s, with territories such as Chechnya attempting to break away and the government unable to control criminal elements (such as the mafia) within the country. 

Kotkin points out one of the futures missing from his 5 possibilities is the one where Russia becomes a major power in a multipolar world. This is what Putin wants, where Russia dominates the Eurasian landmass. A throwback to the Russian Empire/USSR days. I think Kotkin is correct that this is unlikely to happen. At least now, the invasion seems like a geostrategic disaster for Putin. Russian influence has weakened in Central Asia and NATO has become stronger, with Sweden and Finland joining. The Russian military and economy have suffered setbacks, which will take some time to recover from. 

In my mind, the two most likely futures sketched out by Kotkin are Russia as North Korea and Russia in Chaos. Russia is too large, proud and different to be a full-fledged vassal of China, but it can become a “big North Korea”, as Kotkin suggests. Russia is pretty close as it is, but the war has isolated Russia even more from Europe and weakened it enough that it is now more dependent on China. But like North Korea, Russia will still be independent enough to pursue its own foreign policy and domestic path. China did not want North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons and it would rather it not launch missiles over Japan, but North Korea still does it. Similarly, China would rather Russia not constantly threaten nuclear war, but it can’t stop it from doing so. In many ways, this future is the status quo, with a slightly weaker and more isolated Russia. 

The above seems more possible if Putin’s departure is gradual and expected. If Putin’s departure is sudden, either through an unexpected death or removal, the Russia in Chaos future seems possible. There is not a clear successor to Putin, not just in terms of a person but also a justification for the government. There are people to the left and right of Putin. Despite the rhetoric, Putin’s justification to rule is not ideological, it is more transactional. The public supports him because he offers (or offered) stability and modest economic growth (at least in a few cities). The elites support him because they can enrich themselves through corruption without penalty, if they don’t get out of line. The network he has built will be hard for someone else to continue and with no ideological justification or legitimate electoral process, chaos would likely ensue.  

Ahead of this week’s G7 conference, the U.S. announced more sanctions on Russia. The sanctions are primarily in response to China increasing exports of materials used in Russian weapons manufacturing. Russia responded by halting trading in dollars and euros on the Moscow Exchange. The Russian Rouble will likely use some of its value and it may become more difficult for countries and foreign businesses to conduct business in Russia.  

The two big news items to come out of G7 meeting are the security agreement signed between the U.S. and Ukraine, as well as the promise of a $50 billion loan from the G7 countries to Ukraine. The loan will be paid back using the interest earned on $300 billion of frozen Russian assets. These are both pieces of good news for Ukraine and signal the continued support of Western countries, perhaps still a bit more in word than deeds, but still very important. 

Prior to the G7, Zelensky was in Berlin attending a conference on Ukrainian recovery following the war. Although the focus was intended on Ukraine’s long-term recovery, the main story was Zelensky’s appeal for short-term help with energy. Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have severely depleted its production capabilities. Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, said the capacity for energy production has reduced by about 25% compared to pre-war levels. This has led to rolling blackouts and could lead to longer blackouts in the winter. A dark winter without heat is the worst-case scenario for Ukraine. Both Zelensky and energy executives in Ukraine are asking for assistance in purchasing equipment to repair and increase production, as well as air defense to prevent future attacks on energy infrastructure. 

Another piece of news out of Ukraine and Russia are the continued Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets in Crimea. Increasingly, the targets are air defense systems in preparation for Ukraine’s use of F-16 planes. The strikes in Crimea are important strategically, as they hinder Russian capabilities and turn what was a safe area of operations for Russia into a dangerous one. However, they are also important symbolically, as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 began this whole thing. The more Ukraine threatens Russia’s position in Crimea (even if only symbolically) the less settled Russia’s invasion looks. 

Source 

Finally, on Friday Putin made headlines by proposing a path to an immediate ceasefire. If Ukraine will just give up its bid for NATO membership and withdraw all its forces from “Russian” territory inside Ukraine, then there can be an immediate ceasefire. I bring this up, not because it’s a realistic and genuine proposal but because some people will treat it this way. As the two headlines above illustrate, there is a good way to think about this and a bad way. Putin is not proposing a peace plan or a legitimate ceasefire. He is essentially saying, if Ukraine surrenders and gives Russia what it wants, they will stop fighting. But he knows that some in the West and around the world will present it as a peace plan that Ukraine is rejecting and use it to put pressure on their governments to stop supporting Ukraine. It’s always important to remember that Putin can end this war any time he wants. All he must do is pull his troops out of Ukraine and give up his illegal territorial demands. 

The EU elections went about as expected. The center-right European People’s Party (EPP) gained seats and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democracy (S&D) lost some seats. The big losers of the elections were the Greens, who lost 21 seats, and the center, Renew Europe party, which lost 29. The parties on the far right did gain seats, but most of those were with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a not quite crazy far right party, and unaffiliated groups. The most dangerous (from a Ukraine perspective) party is Identity and Democracy (ID), which actually lost seats. The parliament will lean more to the right, but the governing coalition, as the graph below shows, will not look much different. 

The far-right groups did especially well in France and Germany. In fact, the result in France (where far-right groups gained 12 seats) led French President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. The elections will take place June 30 and July 7. Macron’s centrist party, Renaissance, is the largest party in the parliament. The second largest is the National Rally party, led by the controversial Marine Le Pen. Macron’s call for new elections is a sign that he is worried about the growth of the opposition on the right and is trying to hold elections before it grows even further. It is a gamble, but with respect to the situation in Ukraine a change in the French parliament may be the most meaningful consequence (albeit a secondary one) from the EU parliamentary elections.