The Importance of Veto Players

I want to do something that I don’t normally do and continue a theme from the last post. I want to explore this idea of personalist kleptocracy a bit more to understand what some of the consequences are and could be. So, first up is a look at how personalist kleptocracy creates instability in the policy process and less than ideal outcomes.

My dissertation was sort of about this. I explored how variations in democratic government structure influenced the international conflict behavior of democracies (super exciting stuff). The study fit into the larger literature on democratic peace theory, but I was inspired by George Tsebelis’s book, Veto Players. By “veto players” he means people/institutions that need to approve a government action (legislation/decision) before it happens. He argues that the more veto players you have, the harder it is to accomplish things but once things are accomplished, they are more stable. This stability of policy outcomes is one of the factors that make democracies generally successful. They have more veto players than authoritarian regimes, which leads to more stable policy outcomes and results in greater trust and less uncertainty in society. This is great for economics but also social stability and peace. I know my rights (or the rights of my groups) are secure because the next leader cannot simply arbitrarily change them.

This is also the case in the international conflict behavior of democracies. In their book, Democracies at War, Reiter and Stam argue that democracies “win” wars about 80% of the time. Why? It is essentially because they have more veto players (this is not what they say but my interpretation). Democracies need approval from a wider array of political actors, including society, before they enter war. Therefore, they are much more likely to enter winnable wars. Once the decision is made, it is much more stable so it less likely that democracies will simply pull out of the war, which allows society to more fully commit to the war effort. There are many other reasons they discuss, but for our purposes here, those are the relevant factors.

So, having a political process with many veto players results in policy stability, in both domestic and foreign policy spheres. What does all of this have to do with Trump’s personalism?

The decision-making process in the U.S. has become, what does Trump want. This is how personalist governments work. The only true veto player is the person in charge. This is the goal behind all the executive orders instead of laws passed by Congress, the on again, off again tariffs issued with emergency powers, and the disdain toward courts related to removing immigrants from the country. As was discussed in the previous post, personalist governments weaken accountability mechanisms and political constraints. This is just another way of saying there are fewer veto players. And with fewer veto players comes less stable and ideal policy outcomes.

Consider tariffs. They go up or down depending on...well, I’m not sure what it depends on. Part of the benefit of multiple veto players is that policy ideas and actions have to be clearly articulated. To get multiple different actors to agree, a leader has to persuade them this is a good idea. What is the purpose of the tariffs? Depending on the day and the member of the Trump administration, it is either to raise revenues, “bring back” American manufacturing, or create leverage for deals. Nobody knows because Trump did not follow the Constitutional route of having Congress raise and lower tariffs.

The result is policy instability that creates economic and diplomatic chaos. Chinese and U.S. officials had a good talk in Geneva, so tariffs on China were reduced for 90 days. The markets crashed, so tariffs on most countries were reduced. The Mexican president called Trump so the initial tariffs on Mexico were paused. If you are a business owner, how do you conduct business in such an environment? If you are a diplomat, for the U.S. or other countries, how do you conduct negotiations in such an environment? You don’t. Such instability and uncertainty cause paralysis.

Consider immigration. The courts have repeatedly said the due process of immigrants have been violated by the U.S. government. As a result, the Trump administration’s plan of sending detainees to El Salvador, or anywhere else, needs to stop until due process is restored. In a strong democracy, with a strong rule of law, the courts are a prominent veto player. They protect the legal rights of citizens and those within the country, which creates a certain amount of trust and stability that allows society to function. In places without such strong rule of law, a lack of trust and instability result in less than ideal outcomes.

But, in a personalist government, the leader is not constrained. So, how has Trump responded to the courts’ decisions on immigration? With a combination of defiance, some compliance, and a whole lot of public whining and criticism. Whether or not Trump follow the courts’ decisions is a serious consideration and this creates instability; not only for immigration but for the rule of law in general. If Trump does not follow the courts’ decisions in this area, perhaps he will not follow the courts when they say he cannot arbitrarily fire civil servants, or withhold money allocated by Congress, or not run for a third term. The fact that Trump has already openly defied the Supreme Court ruling on Abrego Garcia is a warning sign that the courts, as a veto player, have lost some power.

But, here is where the kleptocracy comes in. If there are no veto players and decisions come down to the whims of the leader, then the strategy to achieve your preferred outcome is obvious. Make the leader happy. Give him a jet, talk about opening a Trump tower in Damascus, approve plans to open a Trump golf course in Vietnam, buy a bunch of the Trump memecoin. If you can’t do that, then simply talk about how smart and awesome and superhuman he is. The obvious strategy in the absence of veto players is to butter up, bribe, and grovel. Making the leader happy is the way to get what you want.

This is also why the presence of robust veto players leads to less corruption in government, weakens the political power of any one individual, and results in the liberal democracy often associated with the U.S. If there are multiple decision makers, it becomes more difficult to butter up, bribe and grovel them all. The best strategy then is to persuade them with a good policy and negotiate a compromise they can agree with. This is the natural outcome of the veto players theory, and another one of my favorite theories, selectorate theory. James Madison also recognized this and discusses it in Federalist 10 and 51. The genius of liberal democracy is requiring multiple veto players (including the people) for decisions to be made. This results in policy stability, protection of individual rights, a strong rule of law, economic certainty, and reduced corruption.

The move toward a personalist government would see such constraints weakened by reducing the number of veto players. All decisions come down to what the leader, Trump, wants. If carried to its logical conclusion, the result will be policy instability, threatened individual rights, a weakened rule of law, economic uncertainty, and increased corruption.