How is Israel different than Ukraine?

Situation in Ukraine and Russia 

The big international news from this week is the attack of Iran on Israel, the successful defense of Israel, and Israel’s retaliatory strike later in the week. While certainly this news is important on its own, and the concern of escalation to a broader war in the Middle East is worth of attention, the events also have a connection to the war in Ukraine. 

Iran fired 350 missiles and drones at Israel and a combination of Israeli air defense, the U.S., U.K., France, and Jordan were able to shoot down 99% of the incoming projectiles. Ukraine, as it waits for the U.S. Congress to authorize additional aid, faces a severe shortage of air defense systems and ammunition, and continues to hear no from other countries as it asks for help in shooting down Russia’s drones and missiles. Ukrainians are understandably upset and confused about the quick and overwhelming defense of Israel while Ukrainians are left vulnerable.  

My mind has been preoccupied this week with why this is the case. What is different about the situation in Israel as opposed to Ukraine? Why did the West defend Israel but not Ukraine? 

First, there is a different history with Israel than there is with Ukraine. The U.S., especially, has a long history of alliance with and support for Israel. Not only is there a history of longer relations but the relationship between Israel and the U.S. is much closer. As the chart below shows, since Israel became a country in 1946, the U.S. has provided more military aid to Israel than any other country. The U.S. has routinely used its diplomatic power to assist Israel’s security, such as the Camp David Accords, Oslo Accords, and Abraham Accords, as well as advance Israel’s interests in the U.N. Just this week, the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution denying Palestine country status within the U.N. Up to December 2023, the US had vetoed 89 security council resolutions, 51% of the vetoes were in defense of Israel. This is not to say it is the right or the wrong thing to do, only that Western support for Israel in general, but especially U.S. support, has a longer history than such support for Ukraine. 

Second, the physical geography of the two areas is important in two ways. The first is related to the fear of escalation. In both Ukraine and Israel, there is concern that involvement by outside countries could lead to a larger war encompassing more countries. The difference is that escalation of the war in Ukraine would more directly affect the West, while Western countries would be more insulated by escalation of war in the Middle East. A broader war in Europe could affect countries such as Poland and Germany, not to mention American soldiers at bases in Germany and in NATO countries. The same danger is not as pressing in the Middle East. 

Physical geography is also important in a very straightforward way. The distance between Belgorod, Russia (where many missiles are fired from) and Kharkiv, Ukraine (the target of many missiles) is only 46 miles. The distance from Dezful, Iran (a city in Southwestern Iran) to Jerusalem is over 700 miles and crosses the air space of two other countries. The simple truth is that it is easier logistically to shoot drones and missiles down in the case of Israel than it is in Ukraine.  

While history and physical geography are important in explaining the difference in the Western reaction to Israel and Ukraine, the largest factor is simply that Russia has nuclear weapons and Iran does not. The fear that conventional warfare will spill over into NATO countries is important, but the fear of nuclear war is even greater. Russia knows this, which is why they consistently warn of the threat of nuclear weapons even if they have no intention to use them. It is hard not to think that if Iran had nuclear weapons, the response of the West would be different. 

The dangerous part of all of this is that it leaves the West in a no-win situation. Attempting to shoot down Russian drones and missiles will be difficult because of the realities of the physical geography and it risks a broader war with Russia, that could end in the use of nuclear weapons. Hardly an ideal outcome. 

However, not assisting Ukraine more directly in its self-defense and publicly worrying about Russia’s use of nuclear weapons signals nuclear weapons let countries do what they want. If I’m Iran, I continue my pursuit of nuclear weapons because it gives me more freedom in my actions. And even more worrying, if I’m China the lesson I learn is that if I invade Taiwan, I can simply threaten to use nuclear weapons and the West will back down. And then if I’m Japan and South Korea, maybe I want nuclear weapons too. 

The threats associated with not directly assisting Ukraine are much greater than the threats tied to assisting Ukraine. Neither are great options but there are rarely great options in international relations. It is a realm of trade-offs where the least bad option is the one to pursue. 

Very quickly, another event to watch is the situation in Georgia (the country). Georgia’s parliament is attempting to pass the so-called foreign agent law, nicknamed the Russian law. It is nicknamed the Russian law because it is similar to a law that Russia passed targeting non-governmental organizations that receive foreign funding. Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, which has ties to Russia, attempted to pass this bill a little over a year ago and eventually withdrew it because of protests. The same thing appears to be happening now. It is a dangerous move for the party as it could result in an overthrow of the government or, at the very least, reduced popular support. It is an indicator of growing instability in the region related to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and its inability to influence neighboring countries. Another event is the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Elections

The Croatian elections followed the polling closely. The ruling HDZ received the most votes and will get 61 out of the 151 seats in the legislature. A plurality but not enough to form a government on its own. The opposition SDP group finished second with 42 seats and the nationalist Homeland Movement will get 13 seats. The struggle now will be what kind of coalition of parties can come together and form a government. Eleven parties in total received seats in the legislature, so any number of combination of parties may come together to form the government. The danger, for Ukraine at least, is the SDP and Homeland Movement will align with smaller parties who are similarly opposed to continued funding for Ukraine. There does not appear to be clarity on what grouping of parties can reach the 76 seats needed, so more uncertainty is expected. 

There are no elections in the next week with too much of an impact on Ukraine and Russia, so it may be a good time to check in on the upcoming U.S. presidential election for the first time. The election in November will certainly be interesting. Not since Grover Cleveland squared off against Benjamin Harrison in 1892 have we had the scenario we are likely to get in November. That scenario is a former president, who lost the last election to the current president, running against that president again. It’s still early, and there is a lot that can and will happen before November, but the race seems to be 50/50 at the moment. Trump’s early lead in national polls has been mostly erased and it is a statistical dead heat.  

The U.S. presidential election is likely to have tremendous consequences for Ukraine. A Biden re-election would maintain the status quo; continued support for Ukraine. It’s unclear what Trump would do, but he has signaled that he would reduce support for Ukraine and push for a quick cease-fire. Indeed, after a recent visit with Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, Orban stated that if elected, Trump would not give “a penny” to Ukraine. Not a good outcome for Ukraine, but a very good outcome for Russia.